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Abstract 
 
Making use of the relevant literature in the area, this paper proposes a systemic approach 
to the European administration. The difficulty of the research design stems from the 
inconsistency of the regulations European treaties exhibit, as well as from the sectorial 
approaches, mostly of legal nature, on the conceptualization of the EU administration. To 
this we add the complexity of the analyzed process which, under the conditions set by the 
EU enlargement tends to overcome, both in sphere and content, many of the 
administrations of the federal states or international organizations.  
 
The systemic model we propose is a complex system, of a mixed architecture. It is there 
that the self-regulatory processes have a unique specificity and make use of both a legal 
foundation and of complementary processes such are those of Europeanization, 
convergence and administrative dynamic.  
 
 
Key words: European administration, European Administrative Space, Cybernetic 
system, Europeanization, convergence, administrative dynamics. 
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Preamble 
 
The objective of this paper is to build and describe the process of construction and 
affirmation of the European public administration, using the techniques and methods of 
systemic analysis.  The doctrine (Nedergaard, 2007; van der Hoek, 2005, Part III; Ziller, 
2005; Nickel, 2008; Chiti, 2005; Kassim, 2003) usually refers to the “EU 
Administration”, thus establishing a distinct domain of the European public 
administration which adds to the European Union in its latter’s diverse stages of 
enlargement. 
 
As such, the context in which the European public administration is approached is 
determined by the institutional and normative mechanisms which support the evolution of 
the process of construction and enlargement of the European Union.  
 
Also, governance and European public administration are taking a rather rapid, yet 
sinuous way of development from concept to reality, a process that entails both European 
and national elements, interconnected and superiorly complex to any other processes and 
phenomenon specific to the building of a United Europe. 
 
This mutual determination between “state” and “public administration”, presented in this 
paper as “European Union” and “European administration” is supported and argued upon 
by Wessels (1990, 229). There is a broad consensus that public administrations are as 
much a “product” as a “characteristic feature” of what we call the “state”. In all phases of 
the state’s formation, the changes in its characteristics are closely linked with respective 
developments of public administration. 
 
Among scholars, discussing the concept of “European public administration” or “EU 
administration” or “integrated administration” raises a new paradigm which derives, in 
our opinion, from the ratio between traditional and modern in researching public 
administration. In this context, to be refined, the European public administration is an 
“atypical concept in a traditional approach of public administration that allows important 
developments closing it to the modern countries of public management” (Matei, 2005, 
11).  
 
Building from the permanent dispute between traditional and modern and national and 
supranational, the new public administration paradigm adds to the doctrine of public 
administration the necessary substance to describe the major determinants of social and 
political nature, derived from the amplitude and diversity of the European Union’s 
construction.  
 
Starting with the European integration, relevant studies and researches (Featherstone and 
Redaelli, 2003; Kassim, 2003; Harmsen, 1999; Knill, 1999; Kaeding, 2004;  Papadoulis, 
2005; Matei and Iancu, 2010) note that the main processes of the European public 
administration construction are represented by the Europeanization, and administrative 
convergence and dynamics. In a systemic approach, these become the internal, profound 
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mechanisms for regulation and self-regulation of a dynamic, polycentric, and mixed 
social system, such as the European public administration is.  
 
In this context we should mention the conceptualization of the European Administrative 
Space (EAS) (OECD, 1999; Olsen, 2003; Shapiro, 2004) that starts from the idea that the 
constitutional and administrative law principles represent the key factor for democratic 
governance and development. These principles may create a “unformalized acquis 
communautaire” (OECD, 1999, 5), meant to inspire the public administration reforms so 
as to achieve the integration criteria. 
 
This course of action aimed at (Matei, 2004, 30): 
- formulate guidelines for the national public administration reforms; 
- offer certain standards that might measure the reform progress. 
 
These objectives were later complemented by the technical assistance for public 
administration reforms in the EU Member States or the acceding countries.   
 
Olsen (2003, 508) points that: “the European Administrative Space has symbolic 
overtones of European integration and unity and can be seen as part of a normative 
programme”. Paraphrasing Goetz (2006, 2), “the notion of a European Administrative 
Space has emerged as a central point of reference in discussions about trends in European 
administration”.  
 
The normative basis of the European administration 
 
  
The difficulty in the conceptualization of the European administration is connected to 
several motives, such as: 
- The EU constitutive treaties or any other official documents of the European Union 
do not directly and distinctively address administrative structures, administrative 
norms, principles of functioning, etc., of what we call, European public 
administration; 
- Inexistency of an acquis communautaire for the public administration, containing 
standards, criteria and norms for organization and functioning of national public 
administrations in the context of the evolving European integration process; 
- Existence and development of robust public administrations which, in time, have 
influenced public administration systems at regional level. Closely surveying law 
systems of different origins and philosophies, national public administrations have 
developed endemic characteristics which finally remained their own.  
- Globalization of the public management (Ferlie, Lynn and Pollit, 2007, 43-44) and 
strong international influences on European integration theories have determined an 
apparent distance of the European specific of the national public administration. We 
refer here to the general American “best practices”, the appearance and extension of 
the New Public Management (NPM). A compact vision of NPM, as advised by the 
Lynn (2007) is presented by König (1997, 219): „a popularized mixture of 
management theories, business motivation psychology and neo-liberal economy”. 
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The mentioned author notes that in a popular interpretation: „NPM began propagating 
itself globally both because of the inherent appeal of the ideas and because of the 
support of the organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the United 
Nations, the United Nations Development Program, and other international and 
regional forums” (Lynn, 2007, 44). 
 
The historical and political, economical and social context in which the European Union 
appeared and developed could no longer leave aside those realities, especially as the 
founding states of the European Communities had already embraced that approach. The 
legal basis of the European public administration is to be found in the constitutive treatise 
of the European Union. Accepting those regulations as grounds of the European public 
administration takes into consideration a more profound philosophy of the European 
construction based on, as provided for in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), on the 
drawing of inspiration “from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, 
from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights 
of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law (TEU, 2008, 15). 
The same Treaty stipulates the will of the EU Member States “to enhance further the 
democratic and efficient functioning of the institutions so as to enable them better to 
carry out, within a single institutional framework, the tasks entrusted to them”, as well as 
“to continue the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in 
which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity” (TEU, 2008, 16). 
 
If to these general administrative values to be found even in the Preamble of the Treaty 
on European Union we add those regarding the transparency: “the process of creating an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as 
possible” (TEU, Art. 1, 2008, 16), the continuity and specificity: “The Union shall 
respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national 
identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive 
of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, 
including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole 
responsibility of each Member State (TEU, Art. 4(2), 2008, 18), as well as the principle 
of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality: “The limits of Union competences are 
governed by the principle of conferral. The use of Union competences is governed by the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.” (TEU, Art. 5(1), 2008, 18), we will 
discover the fundaments of the European Administrative Space (EAS), representing a 
true “unformalized acquis communatauire” of the European public administration. 
 
To all these arguments that derive from the treaties one should definitely add the 
provisions of the Art. 298 of TFEU which clearly speaks of the “European 
administration”, as a transparent, efficient and independent support of the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the European Union in accomplishing their mission. 
 
As such, hereinafter, we will also opt for the term “European administration”, and will 
make the appropriate distinctions, in all relevant cases. In the context of the creation of a 
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single system of public administration, the process of construction of the European Union 
has been targeted towards two important objectives: 
- Creation and consolidation of the European institutions and optimization of their 
functioning, in accordance to the European Union’s objectives and mission; 
- Reforming of national public administration so as, in the absence of a model of 
European administration, the Member States would assist each other in “carrying out 
tasks which flow from the Treaties” and ensure “the fulfilment of the obligations 
arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union” 
(TEU, Art. 4(3), 2008, 18). 
 
Fulfilling these objectives is to be traced both in the constitutive treaties of the European 
Union, other acts of the European and in the legislation of the Member States. The legal 
foundations of the European administration have developed with those of the European 
administrative law. For the latter, during the debates on the European Constitution, 
several researchers have fostered discussions around „the constitutional bases of 
European administrative law” (Ziller, 2005, 4; Auby, 2005, 18; Sierra, 2005, 29). Even if 
the trends that followed did change the approach (although not drastically), the European 
Law remained „one of the pillars of European Administrative Law” (Sierra, 2005, 29) 
and consequently, one of the European administration.  
 
However, the dispute on the possibility of defining the European administrative law and 
the European administration remains open in the absence of a European Constitution. 
„L’administration et le droit administratif ne peuvent, ni d’un point de vue pédagoque, ni 
d’un point de vue théoretique, se defenir de façon autonome. C’est en portant de la 
Constitution que leur définition peut être donnée » (Vedel and Delvolvé, 1992, 25). The  
arguments of a French jurist, G. Vedel, one of the active participants in the elaboration of 
the European Union’s Treaties are not unanimously accepted.  
 
A large presentation and a clear argumentation in this regard is provided for by Sierra 
(2005, 30 – 31). It is however doubtless that both the European administrative law and 
the European administration are realities of the current existence of the European Union. 
This is actually an expression of what has been previously mentioned when discussing 
the globalization of public management and its consequences to the classical approach of 
administrative law and public administration. 
 
Going back to one of the relevant objectives regarding the creation of a system of public 
administration in the European Union, one must consider the article 13 (1) of the Treaty 
on the European Union, as well the content of the 6th Part “Institutional and financial 
Provisions” of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which 
establish the institutional framework of the European Union. In the same time, these 
articles represent the legal foundations for the administrative institutions of the European 
Union. Article 17 (1) of TEU sustains the administrative character of several institutions; 
amongst them, the most important is the European Commission which “exercise 
coordinating, executive and management functions, as laid down in the Treaties.” 
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If corroborating those regulations with those of Art. 249 (2) TFEU according to which 
“the Commission publishes annually a general report on the activities of the Union”, as 
well as with other complementary provisions of the treaties, one can note another role, of 
synthesis that the European Commission plays when managing the affairs of the 
European Union.  
 
As a conclusion, we can state that there is an institutional system at the level of the 
European Union, one holding also managerial (administrative) functions and 
competencies. the most important institution of this system is the European Commission. 
 
Another approach used in grounding the European administration is the systemic one. 
Yet unformulated, this approach allows us to understand and integrate the main missions 
the European administration recognized as its own; one of these missions is that of 
formulating and implementing public policies, or, more generally said, of applying the 
European system of law. 
 
Our approach is based on the work of Mehl (1992) who deals in a very synthetic way, 
with the “implicit and explicit connections between the general theory of systems and the 
legal process”, where the last can be seen “in its entire complexity and interdependency 
with the social environment” (Matei, 2005, 135-136). 
 
Usually, the legal and public opinion vocabulary uses the concept of “legal system” as 
the set of norms (laws, decisions, and regulations) which are valid in a country or a group 
of countries. To us, this approach is limited. As such, just as in the case of the European 
building process, we should take into consideration, apart from the normative area, the 
institutional (political and administrative), economic and psycho-sociological domains. 
such a vision, extended towards the law system of the European Union supports our 
systemic approach. 
 
Decleris (1992) continues the argument of the above mentioned authors, while sustaining 
the idea according to which there is compatibility between the systemic approach and the 
evolution of the administrative law. “We must identify the public administration inside 
the larger system of governance. That would allow us to define the boundaries of the 
public administration and to describe the latter’s connections with the other subsystems 
of the state” (Decleris, 1992, 149). in such a context, there is likely to discuss the idea of 
a model of European administration that would reveal both its internal structure as well as 
the networks of the European public policies necessary to its implementation.  
 
The relevant literature (Timsit, 1986; Mehl, 1992; Decleris, 1992; Matei, 2003; Matei, 
Matei and Savulescu, 2010) identifies two categories of systemic models that apply to the 
design of a public administration model: 
- structural models that use the conclusions of the organizational theories, with the note 
that public administration “is an organization with emergent and self-evident 
qualities, that searches the public interest through adequate means and procedures of 
the highest quality” (Decleris, 1992, 150). 
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- functional models that are based upon the objectives and ends of the public 
policymaking. In the systemic logic, the functional models precede the structural 
ones. The latter are projected only after establishing the functional models. 
 
The European Administrative Space – systemic support for the 
European administration 
 
The assertion in the title of this section draws from the theoretical and practical 
interdependency between the EAS and the European administration. Both concepts may 
be formalized as dynamic systems that interaction and develop in a systemic interaction. 
The European administration may be seen both as a product of the EAS, and an internal 
process of the EAS, bearing a significant impact on the latter’s evolution and 
development.  
 
Relevant analyses from the approach we propose were made by Goetz (2006), Olsen 
(2003), Matei and Savulescu (2010), etc.  
 
The analysis performed by Goetz (2006) points toward the territorial and functional 
dimensions of the EAS: “the territorial dimension has been addressed, in particular, with 
reference to, first, degrees of spatial cross-country variation in administrative 
arrangements. Topics discussed in this connection include, e.g., commonalities and 
differences in national and regional administration and state traditions; convergence and 
divergence across space or discussions of centre-periphery […]. A second major concern 
has been administrative co-operation across space”. On the other hand, “the fundamental 
dimension of the EAS relates primarily to the evolution of different types of 
administrative authority within this space” (Goetz, 2006, 2-3). The second dimension 
relates to the European administration that may be considered a subsystem of the EAS.   
 
The conceptualization and transformation of the “European Administrative Space” (EAS) 
into an instrument for evaluating the public administration reforms in the CEE countries 
was developed by SIGMA with the support of the PHARE projects, in response to the 
European Council’s requests regarding the process of accession to the EU, formulated at 
Copenhagen, Madrid or Luxemburg.  
 
Can one talk of the EAS when there is an European Legal Space (ELS)? In this case, the 
EAS appear as a specific part of the ELS, territorially limited at being “a geographic 
region where the administrative law is uniformly implemented” (OECD, 1999, 9). 
 
It is obvious that until recently, this administrative space was limited by the national 
borders of the sovereign states and was the product of the national legislations. The 
evolutions that followed (gravely marked by the creation and enlargement of the 
European Union that determined the development of the national administrative spaces 
towards supranational dimensions) lead to the dissolution of the traditional boundaries of 
sovereignty.  
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In conclusion, the EAS “is a metaphor with practical implications for Member States and 
embodying, inter alia, administrative law principles as a set of criteria to be applied by 
candidate countries in their efforts to attain the administrative capacity required for EU 
Membership” (OECD, 1999, 9). 
 
The existence of an European Administrative Space implies that the national public 
administrations are ruled based on common European principles, norms and regulations, 
uniformly implemented within a relevant territory (Cardona, 1999, 15).  
 
The evolution towards the European Administrative Space understands convergence on a 
common European model and may be seen as a normative program, an accomplished 
fact, or a hypothesis. Another important question is to be raised: What is “convergence” 
and what criteria can be used to decide whether an EAS exists (Olsen, 2003, 1)? 
 
The development in question is not a simple process. Quite recent analyses show some 
other possible contradictory evolutions. 
 
Thus, it is stated that “a development of the EAS may be in contrast to the national 
administrative systems, where the structure of the public administration structure reflects 
the identity, history and the specific states of the societies” (Nizzo, 2001, 2). 
 
Still, as the processes of European integration deepen and enlarge, the EAS develops and 
evolves pointing out the values expressed by standards and good practices specific to 
public administrations situated closer to the citizens. In essence, EAS represents a global 
standard for the development of national administrative spaces that will represent the 
basis of the European administration. 
 
The current analyses and studies operate, in different national systems, with distinct 
concepts of the administrative law. Still, “it is possible to agree upon a common 
definition of administrative law as being the set of principles and rules applying to the 
organization and management of public administration and to the relations between 
administration and citizens” (Ziller,1993,11). 
 
In a summarized view, these principles may be presented as follows: 
 
a) Reliability and predictability. These attributes derive from the essence of the rule of 
law which affirms the law supremacy as “multi-sided mechanism for reliability and 
predictability” (OECD, 1999, 12). As an EAS principle, it may be rephrased as 
“administration through law”, a principle meant to assure the legal certainty or juridical 
security of the public administration actions and public decisions. 
 
Other connotations of this principle may be observed when we refer to the opposition of 
the law supremacy in regard to the arbitrary power, cronyism or other deviations of the 
latter that should not be seen as similar to the discretionary power applicable in cases 
when, within the legal framework, a certain degree of decisional freedom is allowed. 
 
 10
Exercising the discretionary power is limited by the principles of administrative law by 
means of which the public administration is forced into acting in good trust, follow the 
public interest, use fair procedures for equal and non-discriminatory treatment and 
respect the legal principle of proportionality. 
 
b) Openness and transparency draw from the reality that public administration is the 
resonator of the society, assuring the interface with the citizen, the user of its services. 
The development of different social phenomena, such as the corruption or mal-
administration, must be controlled by the society. This urges the administration to 
become available and to offer sufficient information to the exterior. As such, the 
openness and transparency refer to these exact attitudes and constitute the necessary 
instruments for achieving the supremacy of law and the equality before the law and its 
representatives. Assuring the openness and transparency, we protect both the public and 
individual interests.  
 
We refer here to practices imposed by the administrative principles, like in the case of 
administrative actions being accompanied by statements of reasons, etc. To this, we may 
add the necessity to grant the access to public recordings, the restrictions placed for the 
civil servants and the necessity for the chosen authorities to exactly represent the public 
interest. The Lisbon Treaty sets out a more stable institutional system, and advocates in 
this respect for a more democratic, responsible and transparent governance. 
 
It should be noted that openness gained new characteristics once the public 
administration was considered to be a public service. In this context, openness becomes 
acquisitiveness to the citizens or other authorities’ initiatives regarding the improvement 
of public services and their getting closer to the citizen. A new concept emerged, largely 
described by OECD (1996) that of the open administration. 
 
c) Accountability. It is one of the instruments showing that principles like the rule of law, 
openness, transparency, impartiality, and equality before the law are respected; it is 
essential to ensuring values such as efficiency, effectiveness, reliability, and 
predictability of public administration. As it is described by the authors of the EAS, 
accountability means that any administrative authority or institution as well as civil 
servants or public employees should be answerable for its actions to other administrative, 
legislative or judicial authorities. 
 
Furthermore, accountability also requires that no authority should be exempt from 
scrutiny or review by others, which means that, simultaneously or priory, mechanisms for 
implementation are created. 
 
These mechanisms contain a complex of formal procedures that give a concrete form to 
the accountability act, as well as supervision procedures that aim to ensure the 
administrative principle of “administration through law”, as it is essential to protect both 
the public interest and the rights of individuals as well. 
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d) Efficiency and Efficacy. The introduction for the public sector and public 
administration of the efficiency and efficacy as important values is relatively recent. This 
is to be understood since today, when serious fiscal constraints and development of the 
goods and services are in place, talking of an economic optimum for the public sector is 
possible (Matei, 2004, Ch VI).  
 
In this context, efficiency becomes a managerial value that points towards maintaining 
the optimum equilibrium between the allocated resources and the obtained results, while 
efficacy – a connected value that makes sure that the activity of the public administration 
achieves the intended objectives and solves the public problems recognized by law and 
the governance process as in its duties. 
 
The analyses in the field show that it is possible to discuss of contradictory developments 
between assuring efficiency ad the rule of law. The European Commission has already 
intervened, by creating legal institutional solutions – directives to prevent these 
developments. European Community law also calls for efficient administration, 
particularly with regard to the application of Community directives and regulations. 
 
Relevant to this end we may note the reinforcement, under the Lisbon Treaty, of the  
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, where for 
the Commission, it is stated that “any legislative proposal should contain a detailed 
statement […] which […] should contain some assessment of the proposal's financial 
impact and, in the case of a framework law, of its implications for the rules to be put in 
place by Member States, including, where necessary, the regional legislation” (article 4). 
 
The above principles are not only theoretical in value. They constitute the base for an 
unitary application of the principles of the administrative law within the national 
administrations and the construction and enlargement of the EAS. These principles may 
not function on the basis of a simple knowledge; in turn, they assume a gradual, daily 
effort for interiorizing the EAS’ principles as inherent to the administration, by means of 
institutional and legal mechanisms. The European Administrative Space appears as the 
closure for a large process that implies convergence, Europeanization and administrative 
dynamics.  
 
The sphere and content of the European administration 
 
Debates on the concept of European administration are more frequently lately and they 
tend to trigger the attention towards the usual absence, from the texts of the constitutive 
treaties, of certain clear and direct provisions on administration. The same can be said of 
the European governance, although, for the latter, the European Commission has 
elaborated and published several important documents and reports (EC, 2001, White 
Paper on European Governance). The aforementioned document speaks of good 
governance, a concept “introducing a normative yardstick into the discussion about 
governance. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights reflects this turn to a 
qualitative approach to governance; in its Article 41, the citizens are granted a „right to a 
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good administration, about limited to „his or her affair” and focused on individual 
measures instead of on all administrative actions” (Nickel, 2008, 128). 
 
Nickel (2008, 125-146) speaks, amongst others, of the link between European 
governance and European administration. His analysis is framed against the debate on the 
normative legitimacy or basis of the European administration. A redefinition of the 
European governance as an “integrating administration” „has to take the new 
developments of a distinct European administrative governance sphere seriously. At the 
some tine, it has to address to specific legitimory problématique of the new governance 
structures in a sufficient manner”. The author draws the attention towards „the odd 
position of European governance, which oscillates between legislative and administrative 
functions” (Nickel, 2008, 125-126).  
 
The main ideas that are traceable in Nickel’s study (2008) may be summarized as 
follows: 
- The European administration and governance are not legal concepts. The specific 
terminology of these concepts has been rapidly accepted by the social and political 
sciences both as an empirical category for new forms and modes of power exercise, 
as well as an analysis category that would point towards the specific difference 
between the classical concepts of governance and administration. The aforementioned 
create a rather new situation – lacking in legal consistency and rigueur – in the 
exercise of public powers in the European Union: creation of administrative 
mechanisms – the open method of coordination, comitology, interwined public-
private regulatory mechanisms – in the absence of parliament’s legal acts controlled 
by the judicial. This creates an attitude of openness and flexibility in approaching the 
European administration and governance.  
- The important role of the secondary norms for European administration is a result of 
the fact that the „European administrative Law consists of a patchwork of scattered 
EC treaty provisions, general principles of European law shaped by the ECJ and its 
case – low, and secondary norms within special fields of regulation” (Nickel, 2008, 
129). It should be noted however that the Lisbon Treaty (Art. 290, TFEU) brings 
significant changes by introducing the system of „delegated acts” which will delegate 
the Commission the competence of adopting acts of no legislative character but 
general application. in fact, these provisions modify the old existing comitology 
procedure and includes acts of delegation and implementation.  
- The general attitude of some of the European administrative law theorists and 
practitioners, to use the concepts of administration and governance (Craig, 2005; 
Schwartze, 2005). This happens when, in other areas, the sphere of administrative and 
regulatory activities was enlarged: the re-regulation of the European internal market 
in the 80s, of the education, health, social, radio and public transport services in the 
90s, as well as of the public order, presently. The attitude in question denotes a 
certain attachment of several authors to the traditional legal domain, and to a different 
reality which derives from the evolution of important administrative processes such 
as the one of decentralization. in this context we need to observe that the 
„administrative actions in the European realm are increasingly „decentred” in the 
sense that they are neither rooted in a single legal source or structure, nor are they 
 13
formed or implemented by a single administrative entity, be it the European 
Commission, or the administrations of the Member States, respectively (Nickel, 2008, 
132). These processed were called „integration décentralisée” (Chiti, 2004, 402) and 
„decentralisation integrée” (Azoulay, 2005, 44). Nedergaard (2007) speaks of the 
“European Union Administration” from the point of view of two concepts: efficiency 
and legitimacy. The two concepts are used to assess the functioning of the European 
administration and its connections to the national administrations and the civil 
services in the European Union’s Member States. The relevant contributions made by 
Nedergaard (2007, 1-2) in understanding of the European administration are 
presented in the several characteristics the author presents at the beginning of his 
work. 
- The unique character of the EU administration, the mode in which it is organized, is a 
result of the special character of the European Union. 
- In some regards, it most like an ordinary international organization while, in others, it 
resembles a federal state; 
- The fact that the European Union has both intergovernmental and federal 
characteristics influences the framework for the Union and the workings of the 
administration; 
- In the European administration, the national public servant are in a system that 
encompasses a range of federal characteristics out, at the some time, are superior in 
some areas to the national administration or civil service; 
- The game of power politics in the European administration in many ways resembles 
what is usually seen in a national administration. 
 
Another approach is offered by Pollack and Rieckmann (2008) who underline the 
necessity and imminence of an unified administrative space; one being an integrant part 
of any building process of a political system. The two authors consider that the 
accelerated agentification of the European Union has created a complex administrative 
space characterized by simultaneous centralization and fragmentation which may lead 
towards a crossing point for the European Union. The administrative cooperation inside 
and outside the primary legislation, establishing a high number of agencies with 
divergent powers offer the arguments for the assertion Pollack and Rieckmann (2008, 
771) made.  
 
In the above context, the concept of European administration is clearly designed, despite 
the existent differences in employed approaches and methods.  
 
In our view, we will consider that the European administration may be defined in a 
broader and narrower sense”. In the first instance, the European administration „may be 
regarded as all administrations that participate in the decision-making process of the 
European Union, i.e. national and all supranational administrative units of the EU”, while 
in the second, it is seen as „the administration in Brussels that is permanently employed 
by the Commission” (Nedergaard, 2008, 3). We should however say that even if the 
European Commission is the main European institution with administrative competencies 
defined by the treaties, one should not ignore the administrative influences exercised by 
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other European institutions, such as: The Secretariat General, the Council, the European 
Parliament, the Court of Justice, etc. 
 
In his analysis, Nedergaard (2008, 7) concludes that the European administration is a “a 
political hybrid between a national and international administration”. His argument for 
this mixed character „is that European cooperation clearly has federalist as well as 
intergovernmental traits. The mixed traits reflect the basis contrast in the EU between the 
desire for some degree of supranational governance and the Members States perceived 
need for control”. 
 
Hofmann and Türk (2006) consider that this “classical” model of European 
administration, also named “executive federalism” (Laenaerts, 1991, 21) with a 
distribution of administrative functions on two distinct levels, does not reflect the reality 
of the administrative action inside the European Union. 
 
True enough, while the existent legal framework up to the Lisbon Treaty sees the 
Member States as executives of European inputs, currently one can observe “an intense 
cooperation between administrative actors of Member States in all the phases of the 
practical cycle, meaning: agenda setting, decision-making and implementation” 
(Hofmann and Türk, 2006, 107).  
 
Acknowledging the persistency of the inputs the European Union provided, the authors 
noticed the reality through which the Member States produce inputs. Here, the European 
Union is involved, thanks to a composite administrative procedure, increasingly more in 
implementing administrative programs what are nationally defined. The theoretical 
academic model, as formulated by the political scientists, is that of the “multilevel 
governance”. Both Hofmann and Türk (2006) and Nickel (2008) ask themselves if that is 
a correct metaphor. The answer can be traced if we analyze several relevant states and 
processes of the European administration. Thus, in certain important areas, such as that of 
European Union’s committees – the comitology – theoretically distinct levels distincte 
„melt together into a Verbund, a compound operation in which the roles of the controlless 
and the controlled siem to have become twisted and entangled” (Nickel, 2008, 134). The 
analysis continues by showing that the most remarkable feature of this Verbund is the fact 
that it largely functions outside the borders of the treaties: the European committees and 
the European agencies are not clearly defined by primary regulations.  However, the legal 
framework that allows them to work (from an administrative point of view) is of 
secondary nature. Similar issues are raised for the case of ECJ and its interpretations and 
interventions that are highly targeted.  
 
In this context, Hofmann and Türk (2006) use the concept of “integrated administration” 
which defines the administration „with the result that is comprises any activity by actors 
from the EU or Member States, which fulfill public duties and are not directly elected 
legislators, members of Member States governments (such as Ministers in the Council) or 
members of the judiciary” (Nickel, 2008, 135). This definition denotes that each action of 
the European public officials, with the notable exceptions already mentioned, is an 
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administrative action. The definition includes, also, the preparation of the legal acts and 
of the regulatory activities under the generous umbrella of the Commission. 
 
Such a large definition implies a very large sphere of administration law that includes all 
the legal relations between civil servants and between civil servants and the European 
citizens. „As a consequence, administrative rules and principles are rules which regulate 
the functioning of the EU and the interaction between its institutions as well as the 
relations between individual and public bodies in the implementation of EU policies ... if 
read in this way, the whole legal structure of the EU would add up to „administration”, a 
definition upon which the strongest critics of the EU and its democratic deficit could 
easily and happily agree” (Nickel, 2008, 136). 
 
The above mentioned definition cannot generate a clear delimitation between 
“legislative” and “administrative”, which often appears in the case of national 
administrations. A better understanding of the concept of “integrated administration” may 
be achieved by connecting it with what Nickel (2005, 129) names “a modern 
understanding of European governance”. With the assistance of several valuable 
contributions (Ladeur, 1997, 41; Somek, 2003, 704; Dehouse, 2002, 207), Nickel (2008, 
129) defines the European governance like an „hierarchical compound of Eurocrats who 
act as policy-planners and makers, organizers, network coordinators and supervisors in 
countless policy networks does not pre-empt a description of the EU in administrative or 
bureaucratic terms, at least from a legal point of view”. 
 
The integrated administration will thus be increasingly dominated by something 
Hofmann and Türk (2006) name as “homogeneous organization phenomenon”, generated 
by the different patterns of administrative interactions. As such, the European 
administration moves further away from being the administration of a federal state or of 
an international organization, for that matter. All the authors quoted above conclude that 
this hetero-hierarchical and homogenous governing structure is a normative model 
desired by the European administration under the condition of a larger and more intensive 
participation of the Member States’ administrations.  
 
The model presented above avoids the creation of a highly hierarchical administrative 
structure that might threaten the sovereignty of the European Union’s Member States and 
creates the image of unity in an area where diversity prevails (Hofmann and Türk, 2006, 
4).  
 
Hoek (2005) describes the “European Union public administration” as an European 
reality, based upon the European law that represents the synergy of the European 
institutional development, the creation and functioning of the internal market, of the 
financial and budgetary policies, and of the external, security and judicial cooperation 
policies and, last but not least, of the relations between the European Union and the 
national, regional and local administrations. Practically, this vision represents one of the 
most complex ones existent, and extends the national idea of a public administration 
being a social “resonance box” that synthesizes and exteriorizes the effects of different 
social, political, or economical mechanisms and processes, towards the European level.  
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Placing these reflections on the role and influence of national administrations and their 
relationships with the European institutions, and the policymaking process in the political 
scientists area, Colina and Molina (2005, 341) speak of „the rapid growth of studies 
explicitly seeking to examine the domestic dimension of the integration process, and the 
impact of membership on national political systems”. 
 
„From an analytical or conceptual standpoint, national governments position, influence, 
and interaction with the EU have been the main leitmotifs preoccupying all those who 
aim at determining the organizational nature of the Union, or at explaining the pace and 
outcomes of the integration process (Colina and Molina, 2005, 342). 
 
Reviewing the different types of approaches regarding the “organizational nature” of the 
EU, the authors previously mentioned formulate, for their analysis, a series of premises: 
 
- The EU as a multilevel polity that produces multiple interactions and historically 
determined constellations of power between national and supranational institutions; 
- The letter have acquired their own logic and a certain autonomy, member-states seem 
to retain the capacity to reform supranational institutions and to some extent to 
control the pace and scope of integration; 
- For under national governments, the political and bureaucratic officials or 
representative both at the executive and the legislative branch that aggregate member 
– states interests at home and represent them at the supranational level; 
- National governments are not considered unitary actors, or the only gatekeepers 
between supranational and domestic levels (Colina and Molina, 2005, 343 – 344). 
 
Concluding over the sphere and content of European administration, the contributions 
presented above reconfirm the difficulty of such an argument. The trials so far diverge 
from the traditional (national) approach of the public administration, but make use of the 
mechanisms offered by the so called “blank concepts” (OECD, 1999, 91). As such, in the 
first instance, we can consider that the European administration is a “blank concept” 
which offers the capacity to adapt itself according to the evolutions of the social values 
promoted by the European Union. 
 
In this context, the concept of European Administrative Space remains a metaphor that 
describes the “evolutive process of convergence of the national administrative laws and 
the administrative practices of Member States” (OECD, 1999, 6). In this evolutive 
process, principles of public administration legal framework are commonly found in 
Member States. As such, the relevant literature speaks of a possible administrative law as 
a “set of principles and rules that refer to the organization and management of public 
administrations and to the relationships between the administrations and the citizens” 
(Ziller, 1993, 18). 
 
A clear definition for the public administration area remains however a difficult problem 
which may occasionally generate confusion or degenerate in injustice, inconsistency or 
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even contradiction. For that matter, “for a legal point of view, using “blank concepts” 
may seem appropriate due to their flexibility in divergent situations” (OECD, 1999, 9).  
 
The systemic approach we refer to in the previous section of the paper needs to valorize 
the presented contributions and points of view, partially and briefly, in this section. In 
this context, the European administration includes European and national elements that 
design it as a system with a mixed architecture, multi-polar in nature, and conceptually 
and normatively traceable in the constitutive treaties of the European Union, the practice 
of the national administrations and the literature. Such an attempt for such an architecture 
is achieved by Peristeras and Tarabanis (2004), who use the conceptual inter-operability 
of public services at European level for generating the Unitary European Network.  
 
This characterization is necessary but not sufficient, as the European administration 
appears to several authors as a “curious hybrid, resulted from the continuous interaction 
between the supranational and national levels” (Kassim, 2003, 142).  
 
To these points, the same author adds several other arguments which consist in: 
- The existence of connection between the administration and the political system 
of the European Union. Here, the administration is determined by the nature of 
the European Union seen as a political system and by the impact of the European 
administration on the political system of the European Union. 
- Consolidation of the national administrations in the bureaucratic system of the 
European Union which had major consequences for its functioning. 
- National administrations were influences, yet not transformed by the European 
Union’s development. 
 
At the end of this section we point towards the integrated vision of the European 
administration, a vision which we support. Thus, in line with the previous analyses, we 
will consider several hypotheses that will base the systemic approach of the European 
administration: 
- The European Administration may be considered from a formally or 
organizational standing point and a material or functional one.   
- From the organizational point of view, the European administration may be 
sketched so as to largely bring together all the European and national institutions 
and structures that are involved in the organization and execution of the 
provisions set forward in both the European treaties, as well as in other European 
legal acts and the national legal frameworks. Stricto sensu, the European 
administration would name all the European institutions and structures that bear 
administrative competencies. These two spheres of European administration are 
complementary linked in a body-part relationship, one that suggests systemic 
interactions, including hierarchical ones. The two spheres are to be added to the 
ones of national administrations of Member States, and are to considered as parts 
of the European administration (lato sensu defined) and quasi-hierarchic situated 
in relation to the European administration (stricto sensu defined). The two spheres 
are administratively cooperating with other public administrations of the Member 
States.  
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- From a material, functional point of view, the European administration comprises 
of those activities through which legal norms are organized and executed in the 
European Union. 
 
Following the idea of a systemic integration of administrative actions in the context of a 
social environment, and deriving from Mehl (1966), Chevalier (1994) and Timsit (1986) 
arguments on European administration, we will distinguish between: 
- Axiological activities, with executive and / or management character, that determines 
the values of European administration system and their finality. These activities are, 
essentially, political in nature and belong to the EU institutions, at large, and the 
Parliament and the Council, in short. 
- Guiding activities, with roles in counseling, regulation and control, meant to establish 
the normative, institutional and executive mechanisms necessary to achieving the 
values of the European administration system. These activities belong to the 
European Commission as well as to other European or national structures such as the 
European agencies or the different levels of central national administrations. 
- Executive activities assure the accomplishment of the effective scopes of the 
European administration. According to the desired end and the social level at which 
that is achieved, mostly the European agencies and other administrative bodies as 
well as the national administrations become involved.  
 
In another approach, the European administration appears to be a subsystem of a social 
system that belongs to the European Union; its inputs are defined by a system of 
axiological activities and the outputs are managed by a subsystem of complementary 
activities. 
 
The legitimacy of the European administration 
 
Long debated in several studies (Nedergaard, 2008; Hoek, 2005; Peters and Pierre, 2007), 
the legitimacy of the European administration is, most often connected to the more 
general topic of EU legitimacy. This context helps us to integrate the legitimacy of 
European administration in a larger theoretical setting that considers legitimacy as: “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, value, beliefs, and 
definitions” (Suchman, 1995, 574). Legitimacy is, in fact, an abstract concept, with no 
material shape. To observe it is a subjective process, more related to a collective 
assessment of the social mission and impact of an institution or organization. Bearing in 
mind this definition, and following the leading ideas of several general studies on the 
issue of legitimacy (Tilling, 2004; Suchman, 1995; Hybels, 1995; Mathews, 1993) we 
will distinguish between two levels of analysis of the European administration legitimacy 
(Figure 1): 
- A level of institutional legitimacy, based on the acceptance and perception of the 
administrative character of the EU institutions, and as already presented, of the 
European Commission. 
- A level of organizational legitimacy used by the European administration as a 
mean for being accepted as an organization by social groups, national 
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administrations and governments or other important actors of the EU building 
process. 
 
 
Figure 1: Legitimacy levels in the European administration 
(Adapted after Tilling, 2004, 3) 
 
 
The institutional legitimacy of the European administration is part of the EU institutions’ 
legitimacy that are based on the EU’s rule of law, on the political and democratic 
processes that support the construction and evolution of the EU and the social perception 
the EU and foreign citizens have on those European processes.  
 
As far as the organizational legitimacy is concerned, it appears as a dynamic process 
based on the Treaties’ wording, the European administrative law development, the 
organizational model, the functioning mechanisms and, of course, the organizational 
efficiency. All these aspects are largely covered by the existent literature, and several 
arguments, even if contradictory, are presented.  
 
In this context, and adapting Suchman’s opinion (1995, 575-6), the administrations seem 
to try to find the congruence between the associated social values and/or those involved 
by their activities and the behavioral norms that are accepted in the larger social system  
where they are integrated. In so far as the two value systems are congruent, one can speak 
of an organizational legitimacy. Hybels (1995, 243) notices the importance the relevant 
stakeholders have for each organization. In our case, these relevant stakeholders may be 
the law – formal legitimacy or the citizens – social legitimacy.  
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Nedergaard (2008, 8) defines the formal legitimacy as “the situation where the decisions 
are taken under the direct obedience of a procedures that was predetermined by the 
governors or their representatives”. He also considers that the societal or popular 
legitimacy reflects the way “decisions are consonant to the expectations and the majority 
of the citizens.  
 
We have discussed of formal legitimacy once we have dealt with the legal basis of the 
European administration. It is remarkable in this regard the interest the EU institutions 
show for the formulation of legal documents in order to assist the European 
administration. The statistic of these EU official documents is presented in Table 1. 
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7 30 146 35 5 81 55 79 77 515 
 
Table 1: EU documents on European administration  
(source: Archive of European Integration (AEI): Institutional Administration, 
Development & Reform, http://aei.pitt.edu) 
 
 
Regarding the societal legitimacy, the most important stakeholders are the Member States 
and the EU citizens, both subjects and observers of the societal legitimacy. Nedergaard 
(2008, 38-39) observes several aspects that influence the societal legitimacy: 
- The societal legitimacy of the European administration is continuously 
transforming due to the fact that the Member States participate in more stages of 
policymaking and thus contribute to the increase in the EU decisions’ legitimacy. 
- The emergence of new modes of participation to policymaking, that have resulted 
in forming coalitions or cooperation agreements, may block the EU policy process 
or it may modify it so to better respond to the states’ interests. 
- Citizens have fewer possibilities to control and influence the EU decisions. 
- The last amendments brought by the Lisbon Treaty extend the traditional political 
boundaries of policymaking, but the problem remaining refers to the way the EU 
citizens accept new limits of majority decisions. 
 
The open issue that prevails has to do with identifying new elements to support the 
societal legitimacy of the European administration when the citizens do not want to fully 
accept the decisions, and yet are forced to become subjects of the European 
administration’s decisions. 
 
Weiler (1991, 419) advances two sets of conditions for maintaining the societal 
legitimacy: 
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- The existence of a clear and tangible way to allow the citizens’ welfare to 
manifest. 
- None of the existent Member States should be neglected with regard to the 
important political objectives. 
 
From this perspective, in the context of the European integration’s deepening process and 
the EU reform, the relevant literature (Christiansen, 1997; Timsit, 2010; Nedergaard, 
2008) reveals the debates on the „legitimacy deficit” or the „legitimacy crisis” of the EU. 
The EU triangular model of legitimacy has developed based on its three fundamental 
elements: the democratic values of governance, the actual integration and the national 
autonomy, which need to be balanced in order to maintain legitimacy. 
 
As such, we can speak of a legitimacy deficit when we have taken into account all the 
three elements presented above. To these, we add the contradictory stages „between 
intergovernmental bargaining, functional administration and democracy [which are] 
embedded in the treaties establishing the European Communities” (Wallace and Smith, 
1995, 140). 
  
Next to the necessary balance supposedly offered by the EU constitutive treaties, the 
economic results play a fundamental role in keeping and increasing the EU legitimacy. 
Lipset (1994, 1) underlined that: “to attain legitimacy, what new democracies need above 
all is efficacy, particularly in the economic arena, but also in the polity”. 
  
The European administration – including the EU institutions’ administrations and the 
national administrations, offers the necessary public action support for ensuring the EU 
legitimacy.  
 
The EU legitimacy deficit transfers to a European administration through its two levels 
described earlier. Simultaneously, new sources of legitimacy deficit appear, sprung out of 
mechanisms that belong to public administrations.  
 
A relevant approach may be found at Timsit (2010, 17-22) which analyzes the issue of 
legitimacy deficit starting from “the crisis of the traditional normativity”. Invoking the 
two normative models  the contemporary society ever knew – the market and the state – 
the author points towards the two types of normativity that belong to the models 
presented – spontaneous normativity, for the market and imposed normativity for the 
state. The crisis of traditional normativity results even from the “ideal”, unrealistic 
character of the two models, and overcoming it needs a new social normativity, “a 
dialogue based normativity”, “fondée sur le dialogue de ceaux et avec ceux auxquels elle 
est destinée, puisse retrouver et reinventer sa legitimité face á ceux, et perfors avec ceaux 
– lá mêmes qu’elle prétend régir”. 
 
The European integration process transfers and prolongs that analysis at the EU levels 
where the evolutions regarding the internal market as well as those on European 
administration might be affected by the two types of normativity Timsit discusses (2010). 
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A dialogue, based on a new social normativity is necessary and to initiate this dialogue, 
Timsit (2010) points toward a double effort: that of reinventing the state by creating and 
multiplying new forms of public action that are meant to stimulate the dialogue we refer 
to, and the effort to promote the civil society. The context of European administration and 
of its legitimacy deficit is considered by the same author as more relevant when 
describing yet a new crisis: “la crise née du défi de la complexité des sociétés et de leur 
systéme de gouvernance” (Timsit, 2010, 23). 
 
The social complexity, with its multiple determinants, including the mondialisation 
phenomenon, lead to overcoming the early mentioned, traditional models. Modern 
administrations have their specific characters that describe even the opposite from the 
traditional models, and become, as considered by Béck (2001, 59) „l’étrange mélange 
entre nature et société”, „la figure hybride du nuage radioactif, cette  instance  de la 
civilisation transformée en puissance naturelle” denoting „la dramatique inadéquation de 
l’Etat traditionnel aux nécessités contemporaines de l’action publique” (Timsit, 2010, 
24). 
 
The changes asked by the analyses presented above refer to the transformation of the 
bureaucratic state into a strategic state with the mission of: re-focusing of the 
administrations on their knowledge-search and conception functions so as to prepare 
strategic decisions; decentralization of territorial administrations; delegations and other 
forms of “agentification”, etc.  
 
The literature on European administration speaks a lot of the same characteristics 
described above. The operationalization of these objectives will lead soon to decreasing 
the legitimacy deficit of the European administration.  
   
Models of European administration 
 
Valorizing the bureaucratic models 
 
As we have pointed in the description of the content and sphere of the European 
administration, both theoretically and practically, the latter is the result of an evolving 
process incorporating the relevant manifestations of the national administrations. The 
reasonable ending of these manifestations are the particular objectives of the Union that 
require administrative actions.  
 
Referring to the concept and theory of the evolving process, the relevant literature 
(Wessels, 1985; Hoek, 2005; Nedergaard, 2008) points toward older contributions 
(Wallace, 1973; Bulmer, 1983) and newer ones (Mittag and Wessels, 2003; Bulmer and 
Lequesne, 2004; Kassim and Menon, 2004). 
 
The possible models of the European administration derive from the macro-political 
approaches of the EU, using aggregated global data. Wessels (1985a) analyses four 
dynamic reference points: the neo-functional / neo-federal assumption of linear growth; 
the realist view of decline; the governance / pendulum view of cyclical up and down; and 
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the fusion thesis view of structural growth and differentiation. The author uses in his 
analyses five indicators: binding outputs; scope enlargement of public policies; transfer 
of competencies; institutional growth and procedural differentiation; and involvement of 
intermediary groups in channels of influences. Approaching the complexity of the 
European integration process is systemic in nature and determines the fusions tendencies 
of public resources at the level of several states; this fact leads to an increase in 
complexity: “This ever close fusion is explained as a dynamic product of rational 
strategies of European welfare states faces with growing interdependencies and 
spillovers, furthered by the institutional logic of EU bodies” (Wessels, 1985a, 271). 
 
From a normative point of view, Wessels (1985b) formulates four series of models on the 
mode the European administration may be conceptualized and operationalized. Following 
the descriptions provided by Nedergaard,(2008, 40-42), the four models may be 
described as below: 
- Supranational bureaucracy, which assumes the creation, at European level, of a 
administration similar to the national one. The impossibility in grounding it 
constitutionally, the complexity of such a system leads, even in the author’s 
opinion, to a major deficit of societal legitimacy and a low level of theoretical 
pertinence. 
- Brokerage bureaucracy, as a new form of administration, whose important 
mission is to reduce the conflicts emerging from the EU policymaking processes, 
by facilitating the necessary compromises. 
- Secretariat bureaucracy, whose functions are limited to the traditional 
administrative ones. The functions of negotiation, control and strategic planning 
are left to politicians. 
- Political bureaucracy, which reflects and incorporates the hybrid character of the 
EU. Its organizational form is placed between that of a federal state and that of an 
international organization. This last model corresponds, in Wessels’ opinion to the 
model of European administration, understood as an “active, open, integrated and 
collaborative bureaucracy”.  
 
According to this model, the European administration needs to have the following 
functions ( Nedergaard, 2008, 41-42): 
- Administrative functions: the European administration must be able to manage the 
normal functions in considering cases, ensuring continuity in the administration, 
preparing for meetings, etc. 
- Technical expertise: the European administration must e able to advice politicians 
on the content of different policies and possible implications hereof in order to 
help give basic political goals a concrete form. 
- Programmatic functions: the Commission, the Secretariat of the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee must contribute 
actively to identifying and analyzing problem-areas, proposing innovative 
methods within the framework of the existing policies and developing 
programmes with medium and long term perspectives. 
- Mediating functions: the European administration must contribute in gathering 
and integrating different national negotiating positions. This must take place both 
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in the single units of the EU’s administration and in cooperation between the 
European Commission, the Secretariat of the European Parliament, and the 
Secretariat of the Council. Additionally, diplomatic and political skills are needed 
to work with the influence the different players.  
- Crisis management: A special mediating function consists of crisis management 
inside the EU and in relation to the external challenges where mediating requires 
quick and well-considered initiatives.  
- Implementation and control functions: In light of the expanded activities of the 
EU, the importance of implementation and control with the EU’s policies will be 
strengthened. Until now, the EU’s administration has had very few 
implementation powers. This makes control functions even more important to 
find out if the policies have the intended effects.  
- A self-regulating function: to exercise all of the functions mentioned above the 
European administration must be able to reform itself continuously with attention 
to the shifting surroundings. This ‘para-bureaucratic’ function demands an ability 
of self-criticism.  
 
“The political bureaucracy” proposed by Wessels (1985, b) creatively valorizes the 
classical bureaucratic models adding to these the functions that derive from the 
specificity of the EU construction.  
 
Increasing the efficiency of European administration devolves in an activation of 
politicians and Eurocrats, and Wessels (1985b, 31) presents that his proposed model 
“does not assume the fact that Eurocrats are substituting politicians, but that their 
cooperation is broader and more intense than normally accepted in the traditional 
Weberian image of bureaucrats”. Nedergaard (2008, 42) summarizes that “the model of 
‘political bureaucracy’ that Wessels develops is an attempt to construct an administration 
with both a high degree of efficiency and legitimacy”. 
 
In addition, we conclude that the Wessels model supports the open, dynamic, complex 
and cybernetic character of an European administration system.  
 
A systemic approach 
The European administration comprises European and national elements that create a 
multi-polar system having a complex architecture, which is ideally and legally 
represented by the EAS. From this perspective, the European administration is more and 
more a reality as the European integration and construction process deepens and extends. 
Still, the above characterization is not enough since the European administration is 
currently “a curios hybrid, a result of the continuous interaction between supranational 
and national” (Kassim, 2003, 142). 
As a system, the European administration has three important characteristics: it is 
complex, open, dynamic and cybernetic. It is however possible to add a few more. These 
continue and develop the specifics of the EAS, thus operationalizing the concepts, 
principles and beliefs that lay down on the basis of the EAS’ construction.  
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The European administration is a system with many characteristics described in many 
reference papers of the literature (Kassim, 2003, 140-142). With the correct adaptation of 
the context, the above may be formulated as follows: 
a) Lack of an agreed demarcation of competencies and powers between the EU 
administration and the national administrations; we add to this that EU as a 
unified system has a complex structure, based on three pillars with different 
decisional powers, structures and procedures. 
b) Fluidity. Many studies have described the Union as a “fluid, ambiguous and 
hybrid” since “there is no shared vision or project or common understanding pf 
the legitimate basis of a future Europe” (Olsen, 1997, 165). Of course, these 
remarks are previous to the Treaty of Lisbon, yet they are still at least partially, 
pertinent. It can not be argued upon the fact that EU is in a constant becoming 
step, in which its membership, rules, relationships, authorities and institutions are 
constantly evolving and its competencies and functions ever-changing. 
c) Institutional fragmentation, by means of which the power at the European level is 
shared between several institutions, and there is no single authoritative legislator. 
Legislative power is shared by two institutions – the Council and the European 
Parliament – that form a “classic two-chamber legislature” (Hix, 1999, 56) and 
executive authority is spread between the Member States (individually and 
collectively) and the Commission. 
d) The complexity of the EU policy process is a consequence of the fact that the 
decision making into EU involves a multiplicity of actors, including, besides the 
Member States the EU institutions and other European bodies and agencies, 
representatives of the regional and local authorities and lobby groups. Each is at 
once an actor with its own interests, an institution with its own rules, code of 
conduct and operating style.  
e) Sectorialization, which show a specific logic for the construction of the EU. A 
broad distinction is to be made between constitutional matters, such as treaty 
negotiations, institutional reform, and enlargement, which involve heads of the 
state and government and foreign ministries – and routine policy of regulatory, 
redistributive or distributive nature.  
 
Of course, all the above do have a close connection to the political system of the EU, yet 
specific connotations for the European administration. With all these characteristics, the 
European administration is unique and creates a complex system that points toward 
achieving the EU missions.  
 
Underlining these characteristics of the European administration leads us to a better 
understanding of its specificity, one that reflects even in the systemic concept of 
European administration. 
 
Several remarks are necessary here. Firstly, regarding the structure of the European 
administration system, unlike any other social systems, is multiplane and tri-dimensional, 
in the sense that the administrative actions take place, mostly simultaneously, in parallel 
plans. These parallel plans refer, on one side to the Member States’ administrations, and 
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on the other, at the EU administration, concentrated around the European Commission 
(the main plan) and national or regional administrations (secondary plans). According to 
both of these plans, a specific typology of the administrative actions of axiological, 
guidance or executive actions emerges. This means that in each of those plans, one can 
identify the multi-level systems of administration: European, regional and national, for 
the European administration plan; or national, territorial and local, for the Member States 
administrations, the secondary plan.  
 
In so far as the relations between the different subsystems, these may be of different 
kinds: 
- Quasi-hierarchical relations, present between EU administrative institutions and 
the national administrations. Although one cannot speak of a subordination if the 
national administration in relation to the European ones, there are, however, 
relations of hierarchical nature, that derive from the Member States obligation to 
see the Treaties provisions implemented and the preeminence of the European 
legislation on national rules. 
- Administrative cooperation relations, active both between the EU administrative 
institutions and the national ones.  
- Hierarchical relations, in the traditional way, that one may find both in the 
European institutions administrations, and the particular subsystems of the 
Member States’ administrations.  
- Referring to the cybernetic character of the European administrative systems, the 
latter are active through the specific mechanisms of self-regulation.  
 
Keeping the systemic analysis language, we can note some of the elements that shape the 
self-regulatory process within the European administration, by looking to the 
developmental surrounding of the European administration. The partial, legal regulation 
of the European administration’ system is actually one of the characteristics of the 
administrative systems. This is do to the fact that the European administration has a 
complex nature and many of the European practices and standards are not imposed by 
specific regulations, but accepted by the Member States. As such, the self-regulatory 
process that characterizes the European administration has, beside the law, some other 
mechanisms, both formal and informal. One of these is the Europeanization process. As a 
regulatory mechanism, the Europeanization is a synthesis of the connections present 
between national administrations and the European level of the European administration. 
 
To this we add several other mechanisms, both direct and indirect, that contribute to the 
formulation of an appropriate feedback for the European administration system. From 
this perspective, we can point out that the national administrations have a pertinent and 
complex influence upon the EU’s decisional process, being important participants to all 
the decisional levels and involved in all the stages of the policy cycle.  
 
The influence we are referring to becomes concrete once we analyze the institutional 
presence, seen from the viewpoint of the permanent representations bodies or lobby 
groups, present both at the European Commission and the Parliament level and at that of 
other institutions. 
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We should note that the national administrations are extremely important to the increase 
in visibility of the European building and enlargement process, and European identity. 
There are at least three ways (Kassim, 2003, 153-154) in which EU has influenced the 
national administrations, thus creating a new form of the Europeanization process. 
- National administrations, next to their national mission, have assumed a new role 
as implementation agencies of the EU norms. As part of the European 
administration, the implementation and obligation to respect the EU legislation 
may lead to further actions, use of new instruments, not completely familiar and 
recruit and training of personnel.  
- As a consequence of the EU’s legislative or judicial decisions, national 
administrations are determined into modifying or abandoning the existent 
policies, change or ignore the traditional instruments or reorganize structures and 
procedures. This fact may lead into diminishing or increase of the administrative 
capacity or change of the public and private actors’ relationships.  
- Adaptation of national administrations to European standards as a consequence of 
the governmental practical implication in European decision making and the 
assumption of the above. 
 
National administrations have been encouraged in developing support mechanisms for 
participation and coordination of actions for their representatives at EU level. 
Undoubtedly, these self-regulatory aspects may be found in the entire elaboration process 
of the EU policies. In the general context of administrative dynamics, an evaluation of the 
self-regulatory process and its dynamics is necessary. This dynamics is also influenced 
by many factors, amongst which the nature of the political system, the centralization 
degree or the fragmentation of the national administrations dedicated to the integration 
process, etc. 
 
As such, a conclusion with regard to the European administration stems from its unique 
character, direct consequence of the EU’s unique political system. Being unique, the 
European administration offers a complex image, marked by national and European 
interpretations and interrelation. National administrations have reached the EU’s 
decisional bodies; they are present in every European area and determine the functioning 
of every European institution. In the same time, the national civil services acknowledge 
adaptations in their structures and practices. We may add to this, the specific character of 
the coordination mechanisms at EU institutional level, and, with direct link to the 
national administrations, mechanisms that are permanently articulated and are formally, 
increasingly consolidated, thus ensuring the foundation for a European public 
administration system. 
 
Concluding for the three levels of European administration, as observed in Figure 2, the 
direct feedback, specific to each level, is mainly determined by the degree of legitimacy, 
as well as by that of efficacy. Loops deriving from the bidirectional effects of the 
Europeanization appear across the other loops of feedback. A bottom-up feedback 
generated by the institutional robustness that characterizes each national administration 
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may also be visible. The intensity of the latter will just as different as each of the EU 
Member States is.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mechanisms for general adjustment of the European administration 
 
 
The decisional systemic of the European administration 
 
The foundation of the EU is constituted on three solid and well organized pillars. The 
first pillar is represented by the European Communities that assure the institutional 
continuity of the Maastricht Treaty and the new Union. The second pillar, the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy does not have a framework formulated by the Treaties or a 
policymaking rigueur. It however founds the Common foreign security of the Union and 
confers the Member States the possibility to speak in one voice on matters related to 
international politics and security. As such, at least theoretically, the national interests of 
the states become subordinated to a common, European interest to be determined by 
permanent consultations between partner states (Gherghina et all, 2008, 12). 
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The third pillar, of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters assures the 
cooperation at EU level on issues that are directly interested for citizens, such as law 
implementation, justice affairs, asylum and immigration. The EU system has developed 
in time with the Single European Act, and the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and 
Nice, thus adding new interests and constraints to the EU institutional framework 
(Spence and Edwards, 2008, 209).  
 
The EU activity is concentrated around the three key institutions: the Commission, the 
Council and the Parliament; the interaction between the three is highly significant for the 
efficient functioning of the EU. The European administration will have a transversal 
position in regard to the three pillars, thus integrating (to a great extent), into the third 
pillar.  
 
The working together of the three institutions leads to the emergence of a triangle or 
“tricameral” decision-making ensemble.  The theorists speak of the existence of several 
decisional forms in multiple levels: 
 
- The intergovernmental model interprets the roles and attributions of the Commission 
and the European Parliament as less important than those of the Council and the 
European Council. In this model’s approach, the Commission offers technical answers 
and pieces of information less obvious politically.  
 
- The neo-functional model – the Commission of supranational technocrats. In this 
perspective, the Commission is a supranational institution holding a greater independence 
towards the Council in the European policymaking. From a neo-functional point of view, 
the Commission is an autonomous and politically active institution that has considerable 
resources for the implementation of European policies. This is about a “legal 
bureaucracy” that makes the daily basis decisions in the policy key areas such as: 
agriculture, internal market and competition (Spence and Edwards, 2008, 210). 
In the neo-functional opinion, the Commission enjoys legitimacy and a technocrat 
capacity of solving problems, and its independency towards the Council of Parliament 
denotes that is a sui generis institution, capable of acting on behalf of the EU. Also, the 
neo-functionalism speaks of a guideline made by the Commission for the Council and 
Member States to follow, in order to improve the Member States’ capacity to solve 
problems and benefit from welfare. 
 
- The federalist model – Commission as a future European government. The disciples of 
the neo-federalist consider the Commission to be a not yet fully developed government, 
and a “union of state and peoples” based on common values. From a legal point of view, 
the EU should have an institutional architecture that may enhance and enlarge the 
decision-making power of the Union and lead to the creation of a “parliamentary Europe” 
or a supranational parliamentary democracy (Spence and Edwards, 2008, 211). The neo-
federalists see the Commission as a centre of the European government that acts 
autonomously from the Member States and the Council, and is yet, politically dependent 
of the European Parliament’s majority. The model looks very much alike the ratio 
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between the Commission and the Council in a parliamentary system, where the Council is 
the second chamber, of the States and their national interests. 
 
- The neo-institutionalist model of rational choice – Commission as a stability factor and 
flexible administrator. In the theoretical realm of European studies, the neo-
institutionalism emerged in the late 80s. The neo-institutionalist approaches reject the 
abstract definition of the inter-institutional relations, but pay particular attention to the 
special institutional context where European policies are taken. The model suggests the 
theories of principal-agent and delegation that study the interaction between 
supranational institutions and Member States. In this view, the model considers the 
interaction between the Commission, the Council and the Parliament as being integrated 
in a complex set of rules and decisions of systemic nature, that determine the action path 
of each institution. In the same time, in the policymaking process, the voting mechanisms 
and the legal procedures from consultation to co-decision are seen as key-variables. The 
model takes into consideration the substantial changes that took place for the European 
Commission: from the European Single Act (that introduced the cooperation procedure), 
to the Treaty of Maastricht (that introduced the co-decision) and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (that modified the co-decision by eliminating the third reading in the 
European Parliament), up to the Treaty of Lisbon (that promotes un efficient decision-
making process and extends the allows the voting by qualified majority, consolidates the 
role of the Parliament and ensures a greater involvement from the national parliaments). 
According to this approach, the Commission has a traditional, bureaucratic role in 
policymaking, and the decisional system of the EU becomes a “bicameral legislature”. 
Also, theorists argue that the supranational autonomy is a function of the Member States’ 
mechanisms. The variation of supranational autonomy according to clusters of problems 
and time  is mere an assumption of the model, just as the hypothesis according to which 
the Commission is strictly controlled by different mechanisms such as supervisory 
committees, sanctions or mandates’ reviews, is (Spence and Edwards, 2008, 213). The 
institutional model proclaims the flexible role of the European Commission and notes the 
downsizing of its powers in setting the agenda and take part in the decision-making 
process of the Council and the European Parliament.  
 
The complexity of the European administration system is evidenced by this basic 
structure of EU decisions. An important view in this regard is provided by Hoek (2005, 
12). The decisional system of the European administration belongs, largely, to the EU 
political system. It develops on the relations set between the main European institutions 
(the Commission, the Parliament and the Council). The structure in Figure 3 reveals a 
systemic structure of the decision-making system.  
 
The role of the European Commission is determined both in the earlier stages of the 
decisional process, as well as in achieving the feedback of the administrative system. The 
description of the significance of relations presented in Figure 3 is presented by Hoek 
(2005, 11-13).  
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Figure 3: Basic structure of decision-making and adjustment of the European 
administration (adapted after Hoek, 2005, 12)
 1 
 2  
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There are at least two loops of feedback relevant to the European administration: 
- The actors of the first loop (1) are the Commission, the Parliament and the 
Council. The loop aims at drawing the path of the Commission’s proposals to the 
Parliament. 
- The actors of the second loop (2) are the Commission, the citizens, the national 
governments and the Council. The most important role here is played by the 
European Commission as the “implementation body and police officer”.  
 
The figure proposed by Hoek (2005) must be amended with other types of relations that 
signal the institutional legitimacy deficit (in loop (1)) and the social legitimacy deficit (in 
loop (2)). 
 
One may also see the triple mission of the European Commission; it is: 
1. Initiator of legislative proposals; 
2. Administrator and implementation body for the EU policies and the international 
trade relations; 
3. Guardian of the Treaties. 
 
As such, in the decisional subsystem of the European administration, the Commission is 
an executive body with numerous competencies in the structure of the Union. It act in 
cooperation with the Parliament and the Council for formulating and promoting the 
European decisions. 
 
The European Commission acts as a European institution with executive role according 
to the provisions of the Treaties. The cooperation and dialogue between the European 
institutions represent the stability of the European administration system. The 
Commission is a body with initiative, implementation, management, control and 
representation roles, guards the Treaties and is the expression of the Union’s interests. 
The main competence the Commission has is to supervise the way the European states 
and the European institutions apply the Treaties’ provisions and the acts deriving from 
the latter.  The institution needs to ensure that the European legislation is well 
implemented by the Member States and that the citizens and the internal market users 
fully benefit from the Union’s presence. The starting point for each European initiative is 
to found in the Commission. The European Commission is undoubtedly the most original 
component of the EU’s institutional architecture. There is no other institutional 
organization or regional integrative structure that has such an institution. In a larger 
Union, the European Commission has the role to maintain the more desired but difficult 
to achieve European coherence and unity and to perform the regulator role for the system, 
just as all the other institutions: the Parliament, the Council, etc.  
Administrative Dynamics 
In its content, the administrative dynamics tries to catch as vivid as possible, the 
evolution of the social processes and phenomena in the public administration space, as 
well as those adjacent, such as strategic management, legislative process and connections 
 33
with other subsystems of the society. “Administrative dynamics is governed by 
legislators or announced and enforced by the courts” (Weber, 1978, 311). 
 
Regardless the country, public administration in itself, is hard to change. It is possible to 
admit convergent structural, content or behavioural transformations, if accepting the 
existence of a certain yet not necessarily unique or divergent model, when leaving aside 
the traditional national values or replacing them with ones not really configured to the 
social realities and physiognomy of a country.  
 
It is for this reason that we believe there is no acquis communautaire in the case of public 
administration. Its existence would assume, a priori, the existence of a European model. 
In contemporary democracies administrative environments are not, however, so simple, 
coherent and imperative. Older or more recent analyses show that “they seldom provide 
public administration with clear competences, rules, objectives and incentives. On the 
contrary, the administration operates in a complex ecology of institutions, actors, goals, 
rules, interests, powers, principles, values, beliefs and cleavages. Politicians, judges, 
experts, organized groups, mass media and individual citizens are likely to hold different 
and changing – not coherent and stable - concepts of ‘good administration’ and  ‘good 
governance’” (Olsen, 2003, 3). 
 
During transition, such as the one encountered in Central and Eastern European countries, 
conceptions of the administration are challenged and dramatically redefined. 
“Conventional wisdom becomes heresy:  administrative virtues are reorganized; expertise 
is scrapped and new types of knowledge, skills and training are demanded. Trust in 
institutions disappear or emerge. Organizational structures, roles and cultures are branded 
illegitimate and new ones are legitimized. Because tensions are enduring rather than 
temporary, any prescription based on hegemonic aspirations and the universalization of a 
concern is likely to foster criticism, countervailing forces and search for a new balance 
between institutions. Theorizing administrative dynamics requires understanding how 
balances are struck and administrations find their place in a political order.” (Kaufman, 
1956, 1058)   
 
The measures regarding the institutional balance are usually political and constitutional in 
nature, and are necessarily accompanied by adequate managerial techniques. Organizing 
public administration involves a power aspect. “The lifeblood of administration is power” 
(Long, 1949, 257) and Weber (1978) observed that “The political masters could easily 
become dilettantes facing a professional administration”. 
Finally, administrative dynamics assumes the dynamics of the public administration 
concept that should imply, a priori, relations between the specific authority and power. 
As such, it will determine an analysis in terms of realpolitik of the evolution each 
administration faced, in different contexts, identities and power and autonomy balancing.  
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Fundamental processes in the evolution of the European 
administration  
 
“Administrative convergence” is a concept that at first glance is clear, agreed upon and 
understood; yet convergence towards a common model imply a reduction of the 
variability and disparities in the administrative agreements (Pollitt, 2002, 473). 
 
Pollitt (2002) argues upon the complexity of this mechanism that makes possible the 
operationalisation of the EAS, and points out towards the difficulty of introducing similar 
administrative practices when several durable differences in the public management 
reform occur. Continuing these ideas, Olsen (2003, 1) discusses two competing, or 
supplementing, hypotheses: a “global convergence” hypothesis and an “institutional 
robustness” hypothesis. These approaches are valid for a general model of convergence; 
when discussing the European administrative convergence several arguments that derive 
from the process of creation and enlargement of the EU may be brought into debate. 
 
Still, in the general context, recent developments in public administration have been 
interpreted by means of two generic models: the “classical” or weberian public 
administration and the “New Public Management” (NPM) (Matei, 2001, 62-64). A 
favorite diagnosis has been a paradigmatic shift “from Old Public Administration” to 
“New Public Management” (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994, 13-14). Regardless the standards, 
NPM stands in contrast to the idea of a unique European convergence. It actually 
suggests that convergence is global, or at least common to several countries. It also 
assumes an “inevitable shift rather than a temporary fad and that the change represents 
progress toward a more advanced administration” (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992, 328).  
 
The vision of a global convergence supplements or may compete with the so-called 
institutional robustness hypothesis1. Here the basic assumption is that the two others 
overestimate the likelihood, extent and speed of convergence, and that Europe and the 
rest of the world are likely to continue with a variety of administrative models. 
Furthermore, both models – the classic one and the NPM, portray the administration as a 
tool for an external principal  - a branch of government controlled by the legislative and 
judicial branches, or by shifting external circumstances. In contrast, the robustness 
hypothesis assumes that the administrative institutions are powerful actors in public 
policy making and administrative change. Likewise, public administration is a collection 
of partly autonomous institutions with identities, traditions and dynamics of their own.   
 
Global convergence then can follow if administration is a context-free, technical activity 
with a single best solution, and if the global environment is currently dominant. European 
convergence can follow if the most important context in the matter is the European one, 
dominant both within the administration and outside it.  
                                                 
1 Their promoters are J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, in their papers regarding the institutional rediscovery, the 
democratic governance or institutional dynamics, published in New York, Free Press, between 1989 and 
1998, and N. Flynn and F. Strehl, in their paper referring to the public sector management in Europe, 
published in 1996, at Prentice Hall.  
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Differently, the institutional robustness appears if context is dominant, and the 
administration has the same degree of autonomy as other different environments and 
established arrangements. An important issue regarding the convergence is the distinction 
between attractiveness, where convergence emerge because one model is generally seen 
as superior, and imposition, where a model is preferred by a winning coalition and 
dictated to others. 
 
Europeanization is a process closely linked to the European integration, and it intercepts 
the impact of the latter on the national administrations. Peters(1997) and Page (1998) 
discuss the link between the Europeanization process and the general tendency of the 
administration to transit from the traditional model of government to the model of 
governance, where the authority is diffuse and agencies claim a multiple role, especially 
in the area of public policies. Governance is generally seen as an alternative to the 
monolithic and hierarchic concept of government. Governance is orientated towards 
horizontal networks. In the context of international cooperation, governance is a reaction 
to the lack of traditional hierarchy. 
 
The White Paper of Governance defines governance as “rules, processes and behaviors 
that affect the process where powers are exercised particularly at European level, and 
make reference to openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence” 
(Schout and Jordan, 2004, 3). Stevens (2002, 1) conceptualizes the Europeanization as 
“the development and extension of the competencies at European level and the impact of 
the Community’s action on the Member States. 
For Radaelli (2000, 4), Europeanization is a process that draws in three important 
elements: construction, diffusion and institutionalization of “formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies”. Europeanization is not convergence, harmonization or equal political 
integration, but stress, concludes the same author. Radaelli’s definition takes into account 
the interactivity of several waiting processes, subsequent to the discussion of the 
phenomenon of Europeanization and expressed, largely, in terms of impact upon Member 
States. 
Page and Wouters (1995) argue that the power in Brussels provide a transfer mechanism 
both for national administrative best practice, thus influencing by Europeanization, the 
national administrative policies.  
Wessels and Rometsch (1995) also, have argued that a “fusion” of national and EU 
administrations has taken place. The end of this process is the convergence that may be 
expressed by the common characteristics of the administrative models. “When we will 
finally say there is an European model or an ideal type of public service, then, the 
administrative systems of the EU countries are convergent” (Claisse and Meininger, 
1995, 441). 
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Most of the studies regarding the way the process of Europeanization affect the national 
institutions and the political approaches draw back to the institutionalist perspective. A 
clear definition of the Europeanization is presented by Wessels, Maurer and Mittag 
(2003, 6): “incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the 
degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic 
of national politics and policy-making”. The relevant studies of the matter in debate insist 
on that pact that the Europeanization process is built on the bases of an institutional 
systematic framework that allow an analysis of the opportunity of the political and 
administrative structures of the European Union (Keading, 2004, 8). 
Kassim et al. (2000) analyze the existing coordination between the use and 
implementation strategies of the EU policies in ten countries of the European Union. 
Differences we have already explored came out of that study. 
Other authors (Hall and Taylor, 1998) use the concepts of the neoinstitutionalism, making 
reference to the sociological approaches and rational choice theory. Their result could be 
convergence or divergence towards a transposed national model, obtained by means of 
adaptation and “gradual socialization of the norms and practices inside the EU system” 
(Harmsen, 1999, 84). 
The sociological approach anticipates the opportunistic administrative structure within 
the national administration, able to determine the transposed national model. 
Convergence thus is realised, in the framework of “the institutions that frequently 
interact or are exposed to timely development, of the similarities in the organisational 
structure, processes, managerial philosophy, resource allocation principles and sound 
reforms” (Olsen, 1997, 161). We should also mention that the real situation presents 
institutionally or culturally unified or fragmented administrations. This is why we talk of 
gradual adaptation, understood, in the case of national administrations as norms, ideas 
and beliefs that help into achieving “the emergence of the similar individual growth for 
national processes and structures” (Harmsen, 1999, 84). In this case, as pointed out by 
March and Olsen (1989), the mechanism is the imitation or the act of copying 
mechanisms and characteristics of other organizations for the benefit of increasing your 
own organizational efficiency. 
The sound national adaptation manages to reflect different administrative cultures 
namely, the enlargement of the set of values and practices and the conditioned 
administrative behaviour. The process is lead by the logic of allocation, of reflection of 
the pre-existent beliefs or legitimate or appropriate political forms. 
In the rational choice approach, the opportunistic political structure of the EU Member 
States may affect the transposed national model. The basic structure of a country, with no 
regard to the federal (Germany, Belgium or Spain), unitary (France, Greece, Great 
Britain) or somewhere in between organization (The Netherlands), the fundamental 
intermediary interest no matter their pluralist (Great Britain), corporatist (Germany) or 
consensualist (The Netherlands) nature, the structure of the executive bodies – collegial 
as in The Netherlands or Italy, unified as in Great Britain or bicephalous as in France and 
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the nature of the political system (dominant, with a small or large number of 
ideologically different parties, or dominant with a   small or large number of parties with 
a feeble discipline), horizontally describe the political system. Higher decentralization, 
with several tiers and bureaucratic actors is involved in the transposition process, a more 
difficult and hard process. From a consequentialist point of view, the Member States are 
expected to converge towards a unique transposed model. Similar developments are 
expected for the organizations placed in the institutional environment and under a 
common pressure, likely to adopt the agreements proven to be more efficient (Kassim, 
Peters and Wright, 2000, 27). 
The anticipated result is a “global convergence of the national practices around more 
effective solutions towards […] common problems (Harmsen, 1999, 84). In this case, the 
performance standards are a direct function of the opportunistic political structure.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The research objective that this paper proposed was an extremely ambitious one; it tried 
to make use of and apply the systemic methods and models for the conceptualization and 
the analysis of the European administration development. Such a difficulty arises from 
the fact that until presently, the systemic approach was not frequently used in modeling 
of social processes and systems of such scale and complexity as the European 
administration exhibits. Naturally, our definition of European administration is quite 
extensive here, as we refer not only to the EU’s own administration, but also to the 
regional administrations and those of the Member States. We must however notice the 
increasing interest the literature has in describing the administrative phenomena and 
processes that complement the building and enlargement process of the European Union. 
As such, a first conclusion refers to the topic of systemic modeling of European 
Administration that remains open for debate and to the fact that the latter benefits from a 
series of solid arguments regarding the theoretical pertinence and the consistency of a 
logical – systemic approach.  
 
The normative fundaments of the European administration system are mainly traceable in 
the spirit of the European treaties; the explicit provisions consisting in a mosaic of 
normative and procedural nature, do not follow the legal, constitutional and 
administrative custom, to be found in the law systems of Member States. This fact creates 
serious difficulties for the understanding and the setting of a unitary, methodological 
framework applicable in the cases of administrative phenomena and processes in the 
European Union. Brought into discussion by the practical administrative procedures and 
methods over five decades ago, the European administration has evolved in a rather 
unique and specific manner that differentiates it from any other administrative system 
that exists in Europe or elsewhere.  
 
This reality derives from the unique and special character of the building and edification 
process in the European Union. From this perspective, we note that the affirmation of the 
European administration, even if insufficiently revealed by the relevant literature, has 
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overlapped with the emergence of the post-Weberian organizational theories of the 60s, 
theories connected with the names of major scientists such as Herbert Simon, James 
March, Anthony Downs, William Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Vincent Ostrom and 
others.  
 
“The new public administration” and the “New public management” can both offer 
theoretical fundaments for approaching the European administration. Actually, the basic 
principles of the European Administrative Space denote new orientations of the public 
organizations towards openness and transparency, efficiency and efficacy, etc.  
 
A relevant comparison from this perspective is offered by Frederickson and Smith (2003, 
113). He discusses the traditional and contemporary principles of public administration, 
easy to find in the European administration. 
 
In the systemic modeling approach, the specific character of the European administration 
is more pertinent in connection to other existent systemic models of traditional 
administrations. Still, the entire systemic construction of the European administration 
may be adapted. We described the same three levels of administrative actions, of 
axiological, guiding and executive nature, with the single amendment that they have 
different connotations and meanings, and are multiplied in distinct levers that separately 
include the Member States administrations. 
 
Another relevant fact for the European administration refers to the complexity of the self-
regulatory process. The rule of necessary variation deriving from the general theory of 
the systems act both by means of legally enshrined mechanisms aimed at ensuring the 
social control, and different other mechanisms such as the Europeanization, convergence 
and administrative dynamic are.  
 
The multiple feedback loops are constituted in a complex subsystem of the European 
administration and confers to the latter the characteristics of a learning system that 
amplifies the openness of the European administration system and ensures an increasing 
legitimacy and efficacy. Actually, as presented by the paper, the legitimacy deficit is the 
one determining the feedback in the European administration system. To this we add the 
need of an increased efficiency, as provided by the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
The studies and researches on the systems of the European administration need to be 
correlated more with the political and democratic European system, as well as with the 
economic and social evolutions of the European Union that influence in a decisive 
manner the legitimacy and the self-regulatory processes of the European administration 
system. 
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